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in New South Wales and the concept of 'open justice'. If the principle of open justice
is to be entrenched by judicial exegesis rather than constitutional referendum -
which is probably much more likely - then steps need to be taken by journalists
now to educate lawyers and courts about the media, the dynamics of their profession,
and the dignity of risk that is a neceJJaryconcomitant of free speech.
Patrick Kl!J'zer is Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of Research in the "Facu!tyofLa» at the
U niuersity of Technotogy, Sydn~y.
ISSN 1443-8607
Volume 2, Number 3: March 2002, 209-219
The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs
© 2002 School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sydney
210 THE DRAWING BCHRD
[I]t is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance,
that justice should not onlv be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly- be seen to be done.'
Open Justice at Common Law
There is no common law r;'ght to open justice. There is a common law right tojllJtice,
and there is a common law principle that the pursuit of justice is ordinarily done in
open court. But the principle of open justice was always qualified.:' The paramount
duty of the Court is to ensure that justice is done.' Openness is usually the means to
that end. For that reason, any person who seeks to have the Court closed has the
burden of satish-ing the Court that nothing short of the exclusion of the public is
necessarv to ensure that justice can be done.~
Media Access To Court Documents in New South Wales
The principle of open justice is applied in context. In New South \'Cales5 it has been
applied to protect the identity of participants in court proceedings" and to preyTnt
the publication of evidence,' the pleadings and even the transcript of proceedings. In
this paper I will focus on public access to documents read in court. In the Supreme
Court of ~ew South \'Cales today. Practice Note ~o 97 and Part 67 rule ~ of the
R I'SIU.'P ..•..[ustire.: Expm·te.>HU',''''' [1'.)2-1-]1 K13 2.56 at 2.5'.).
DaJl!Jmr I' Cooper (1829) 1 13& C 23- ar 2-1-0; 'Ir IS one of the essential qualities of a Court of
Justice that its proceedings should be public. .provided that they do nor interrupt the
proceedings, and provided there is no specific reason whv the" should be removed.' Smtt rScot:
at -1-78.JOhNPaitfax <t':- SOIlJ II Poli(f Iii!J/II/(/1 (1986) .5 l'\S\\lR 46.5 at 471472. CtIllNit!,Zhtllll II The
S(O!J!!NII/Publica!iom Ltd (1987) SLT 698 at 705-706: '()f course there must be exceptions to the
general rule and these exceptions may also be found to be justified bv other considerations of
public interest and public policy In the adrrunistrauon of Justice But these considerations
should not detract from the general principle of openne» 111 iudicial proceedings.'
S,o!! l' S(o!! [1913] ,-\C -1-1- at -1-r-1-38: [obn Ftlll!<l .•..c~ SO/'J r Poli(f 'liib/ll/(/1,1986, .5 :\S\\lR
-1-6.5at r 1. Spigelman, The Hon Chief Justice J., 'Seen To Be Done: The Principle of Clpen
Jusnce - Part 1', (2000) --1-ALT 290.292. See also Fedmil COlli1 o(AIIJ!/il/;{/ Ai! 19-6 s .511.
Srort l'S(o!! [1913] ,\( -1-1- at -1-38.
.-\ccess to court documents "aries greatly in different iurisdicrions, This paper concentrates on
the position in New South \\"ales,
See for example lVitllfJJ l' JIm:rdrtl [2000] :\S\\"C-\ .52 -"larch 2(00); IV/lllmr l' Om/olld CoII\~e
COIII/(!! (9.50-1-3.5), Indusmal Relations Court of .Yusrralia (1 September 1995).
~ee for example IV Robill.': E.'."pm1e 11"1'.1'1 A/litmliati
1999).
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Supreme Court Rules8 governs the conduct of proceedings to provide access to court
documents' The Rule and Practice Note have been considered in a number of
cases. III .\ccess to documents depends on such discretionary criteria as prematurity
and the avoidance of the use of documents for collateral purposes,' I the potential for
abuse of the 'fair protected report' defence under s 24 of the DefamationAd 1974
(NS\Vj,J:' to avoid surprise or ambush,B because some of the material sought is
'hearsay'," and sometimes to protect commercial confidentiality. IS
The presumption is that documents are available. But in some cases courts say that
the presence of the public renders the administration of justice impracticable. But
where the media can show that the public interest in proper reporting of court
proceedings requires access and that access would not be such as to jeopardise a fair
trial or give rise to unfair prejudice to a party in that context, then that access should
be allowed.1G Fear that information will be used by unscrupulous journalists (labelled
by one judge as the 'frenzied purveyors of fear and prejudice'j'" to satisfv prurient
interests is generally regarded to be insufficient, by itself, to satisfy a Court that
proceedings or court materials should be secret.
In some cases, however, it has even been suggested that access to documents should
be denied for the rather more patronizing reasons that the public could only have a
prurient interest in the matter in issue," to avoid 'trial by media'," and to obviate the
/\ person 'may not search in the Registry for or inspect any document or thing in any
proceedings except with the leave of the Court'.
Practice Note No 97 is included as an appendix of this paper.
III Including eisa Limited v Brad) [2000] NSWSC 929; ASIC v Rich [2001] NSWSC 496.
II See both eisa Limited v Bra11 [2000] "\SWSC 929; ASIC v Rich [2001] NSWSC 496.
I: ASIC Ii Rich [2001] NSWSC 496 at [29]-[33]. See also eisa LImited v Brady [2000] -'\S\X'SC 929
at [21], referring to Home Office I' Hamzall [1983] 1 ~\C 280 and Akills IJ Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43
)iSWLR 539 and s 24 of the Detasratio» Ad 1974 (NS\\)
13 ASIC u Rith [2001] NSWSC 496 at [37]-[38].
ASIC v Rich [2001] NSWSC 496 at [41]-[42]. The rule against 'hearsay' is that: 'an assertion
other than one made by a witness while testifying in proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of
am' fact asserted' (Ying, c., Essential Evidence, Cavendish Publishing, Sydney, 2001, 45).
15 ASIC v Rich [2001] NS\X'SC 496 at [43].
16 eisa Limited v Brady [2000] J'o..:S\X'SC929 at [22].
17 R v Clerk 0/ Pet!} S essions; Ey parte Davies Brothers Ltd 19 November 1998, Supreme Court of
Tasmania, at 3.
18 ASIC v Rich [2001] NSWSC 496 at [34]-[36].
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risk of misleading reporting.:" The proposition that judicial censorship of public
information may be in the best interest of the public is a proposition that deserves
verv careful scrutinv."
A Case Study
"\ recent case that throws up some interesting Issues IS eisa Limited I' Brad)'.22 In that
case, the Supreme Court heard an application bv the Australian Financial Rfl,ifW for
access to the transcript and pleadings that were put by the parties in the case. The
case involved an application by etsa for an injunction to stop its former .\Ianaging
Director from dealing with his assets pending the determination of certain issues
arising from his management of the company. The ,'lFR supported their application
for the documents in the following way:
eis« is being purchased bv a publicly-listed companY on the "~~SX.It is in
the public interest, that I can report on these proceedings to the
investment community. I would like the court to give me leave to inspect
these documents because dealing with the parties, who have vested
interests, has the potential to enmesh me in a conflict of interest ...
\\e are seeking access to these documents on the grounds that the
financial press publishing fair and accurate reports about legal actions
involving this companY is in the public interest. In this case, the public
interest grounds are strong because, although the compam' is lI1
voluntarx administration, it is in the process of being purchased bv a
publicly-listed company, ~\ustar.
A t the request of Justice Santow's office last week, I contacted the legal
representatives for both parties about mv application for non-party
access to the statements of claim and defence. This afternoon ~\llen,
,\l1en & Hernslev, representing the plaintiff, advised the voluntarv
administrators objected to mv ha,-ing access.
StOll/Will Ii Speaker o/t/;e Legl~iiatllJeAJJelllbly o/New SOI/t/; IValeJ 0'0 1) (1999) 90 IR 325 at 333,
cited with approval by A.usrrn J 111ASIC IJ FJlh [2001] l\S\\'SC 496 at [27].
ASIC Ii Ric/; [2001] "\S\\'SC 496 at [39]-[40].
21 Till, paper focuses on the Issues amlt1g from a particular decision: for a fuller treatment of the
ISsues raised 111this paper see "\C\\~ South \\'ales Law Reform COrYl111lSSlOn. /J)
PI/lill'iltlo!!, DiSCUSSIOnPaper, 2000. Ch 11. '
KEYZER 'OPE\: lCSTICE' 213
Of more concern, ;\lr Brady's lawyer, Mr ;\lark Petmcco at The ,\rgde
Partnership, said they objected to me having access to the pleadings
because I could not haw a 'fair understanding' of the case without access
to documents the defence want to obtain throughout discoverv.
The .Anstralian Finanaai Rfl'ifllI has serious concerns about being denied
access to the pleadings on these grounds. It is contrarv to the
fundamental notion of open justice if the court gives parties to actions,
who have deeply vested interests, the abilirv to stonewall the media when
it attempts to publish accurate reports about the initiating documents in
legal proceedings. \\'e are only seeking the pleadings and do not expect
to be gi\'en discovered evidence that would bolster one side's case.
Ultimatelv the Court adopted the approach taken bv a Victorian Supreme Court
judge in granting access to the transcript (on terms as to payment) in a similar case::;
I t is highly unlikelv that anv media representative will be in attendance in
court for more than a small proportion of that time. There is no point in
lamenting that fact, still less in tailoring rnv response to this application
on the basis that members of the media could attend if they chose to do
so and thus put themselves in a position from which an accurate report
of the proceedings could be compiled without recourse to the transcript.
The realitv is that the media "ill decide upon the level and frequency of
its attendance here, as it "ill decide other issues concerning its priorities
and the usc it makes of its resources.
A fair comment, up to a point: the media docs make decisions about resourcing that
affect the quality of news cO\'erage. But the idea that a journalist should have to wait
in Court all day for information that could be supplied to them bv the plaintiffs - if
necessary at the conclusion of the proceedings - is faintly ridiculous. /\fter all, the
Courts have confirmed that if a person who was sitting in Court could transcribe the
information put by the parties, and then make a fair report of the information, the
publication would be protected by the fair protected report defence. l-orrunatelv, in
the circumstances, the Supreme Court of New South \Vales concluded that the
availability of the transcript was important. The media should not have to relv on the
parties for information about the case. Lawvers' ethical obligations preclude them
from providing the media with all the information in which the media is likely to be
interested. ~\ccess would promote accuracv in reporting and transparencY in the
administration of justice.
LIIII"I' Group Ltd (III !Iqll' Pri:« rr;llo/IOIl.>" [2000J \'SC 90,211 \Iarch 2(1)0, unreported.
21-1-
But in respect of the pleadillgJ, the Court applied the decision of the Full Bench of the
Industrial Relations Commission in Jtollbam l' l~:gi.datil'eA,IJemb!r (So. I).:' That case
concerned an application by the ~\BC for court documents including pleadings, made
in the context of 'investigative journalism' rather than 'straight reporting':
The "\BC submitted that access to the documents would assist full and
fair reporting. However, this purpose would be best served if the
dissemination of information occurred as part of the ordinary court
proceedings where, after objection, documents were read in open court.
From this it seems that the Courts are only interested it seems in providing
information to people engaged in 'straight' reporting. ~\ccess to the pleadings was
ultimately denied on the footing that the pleadings, like affidavits, may be subject to
objection and consequent revision when the matter was ultimatelv ventilated in
Court. In Stonba/», the IRC said:
It rnav reasonably be expected that the Court's file presently contains
material of a contentious nature as between the parties and which will,
no doubt, be subject to objection and \'igorous testing in the substantive
proceedings. That process, we hasten to add, will occur in open court
during public proceedings. But to giyc access to the material pre-trial
would, we are satisfied, raise the concern earlier expressed as to trial of
such material in the media.
The Supreme Court admitted that the /ll1Jtnilitlll'Fillallcial RflJieul might be 'to some
extent assisted ill its present tmdmlalldillg b} bc71Ji/~gaccess to tbe complete p!eadilj,g/:
But this should neither be overstated nor understated. There is already in
the public domain a broad summation of what is alleged t!lOt(gbit is not
complete. It lacks particularity about the specific allegations. This is in
terms not so much of their general nature as their specific content. But
certainly the Press knows the nature of the allegations, whom they are
about and the quantum involved, Moreover all parties are opposed to
granting that access prernarurelv and for good reason. The interlocurorv
proceedings of 28 September 2111111' in which the injunction has merclv
been discharged J)Y consent orders and undertakings substituted inter
partes, so far baoe been pefed!r comprebfllJible wit/lotlt tbe pleadilj,gJ. There are
on-going settlement negotiations which mav well be prejudiced by
premature release of the pleadings, containing as thev do serious
allegations about a pam'. ~\nd no final hearing has yet taken place on the
(1999) 90 IR 325 at 332
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merits. If and when it does, the allegations may change In light of
discovery and the evidence as it emerges (emphasis added).
Effectively, Judicial Censorship
Certainly, there will be some circumstances in which pleadings are amended or even
abandoned during the course of a hearing, and it may be imprudent to provide access
to such documents until the pleadings are settled. But the judgments in these cases
raise some significant concerns. If a fair trial is not at risk, then it is sententious to
suggest that the public should be satisfied by a less than complete account of
information that would have been available to anyone in the court. If anyone who is
physically located in the Court is entitled, by the principle of open justice, to make a
fair protected report of what is said in Court, then why can't the documents tendered
in evidence or filed in the Court registry be made freely available?
If the Courts want to improve public understanding of their work, they have to give
journalists, the intermediaries between the courts and the public, the opportunity to
do their work with complete information. Journalists are entitled to the dignity of the
risk of the work they do. If that means greater risk passes to the media, then so be it.
If Courts are public places, then the approach that is commonly being taken in these
'open justice' cases is directly contrary to the public right to know.
Constitutional Dimensions of Open Justice
Stepping back from a specific case, it is important to consider the broad principles
involved. 'Open justice', like 'free speech' and a 'fair trial' are the ends of any virtuous
society. In theory the principles are interconnected. In practice, to be enjoyed they
have to be rights, not just principles.
Rights come from law, and from four sources of law: in order of ultimate
significance, international law, constitutional law, statutes and common law.
International legal rights are not yet recognised as a separate type of law with
operative force in Australia:" though international law can and does inform the
development of the common law," can be implemented into domestic law through
statutes," and can be taken into account by government officials when statutory
25 This is the principle of Walker v Baird [1892] AC 41, recently approved again in Viaoria v
Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416.
Mabo vQueensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.26
27 See ie. Kaou/arta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982)153 CLR 168; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
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discretions are exercised.2H International law is not yet part of our constitutional law.
Only three cases have been taken to the United ~ations High Commissioner for
Hw~an Rights by Australians under the First Optional Protocol of the lntrrnationa!
Coienan! Oil Civi! and Po!itica! Rigb/s. It is not yet an effective way to improve the
protection of rights in Australia. And we should not need to rely on it.
The principal way in which international legal norms operate in ~\ustralian domestic
law is through the statutes of the Federal Parliament that implement international
obligations into domestic law. So the ambit of these rights depends on the goodwill
of Parliament and is subject to the rnajoritarian tendencies of that institution. and the
excesses of executive power that are characteristic of ~\ustralian politics. ~\ series of
notable failures by the Federal Parliament to ensure the protection of minority rights,
accompanied by a willingness to roll back protections that are alreadv in place,
indicates that proposals for a statutory Bill of Rights have missed the point.
That leaves the common law and constitutional law. In England, constitutional law
was, in the main, common law. Common law decisions that described the
relationship between courts, gm'ernment and people were, adjcctivallv,
'constitutional law'.
The principle of open justice \YaSrecognised at common law long before ~\ustralian
federation. The chronologv is important because the Constitution is interpreted in
accordance with its common law context a/ the /iltle ql Federation, adapted /0 accord lPitb
contemporary standards (Kevzer, 2000, 93)?Y If the principle was part of the common
law at Federation, the Constitution must be read in light of its existence. The
common law is 'the anterior law providing the sources of juristic authority for our
institutions' (Dixon, 1965, p 203; Brennan, 1998 p V).i"
So, in 1821, the Court of I---:.ingsBench made an order at the commencement of a
trial on an indictment of high treason that no publication of any of the proceedings
was to be made until the end of the trial. The order extended to cover the trials of
even' one of the accused, who were being tried separately. The order was said to be
made 'to presen'e the purity of the administration of justice'." That 1821 case was
"\lillisltrIor Immigralion and Elhni( Atlm":r IJ Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.
C!'l'i/lle I' ThfQllem (1993) 1-- CLR 5-J.1.See further Kevzcr, P., 'Pfeiffer, Lange, the Common
law of the Constitution and the Constitutional Right To :"atural Jusuce', ::YI."Jllslmllllll
Bar Rel,z811J 87, 91.
Di.·wn, 0., '111e Common Law .'l.s .'l.n L'lrin-are Constiruuonal Foundation", 111 Pili/Ie.
\\illiam S Ilein and Co Inc, 'del bourne, 1965. 203; Brennan, F.G.B., 'Foreword to Kevzer, P.,
COllilill/liollal Law, Butterworrhs, S\'dne\', 1998, v,
11 R I) Clemenl (1821) -J.B & ,\ld 218 at 230 (106 ER 918 at 922).
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approved in 1913 in Scott u Smtt, which I will return to in a moment. In 1976 Justice
McHugh, when a member of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, said:
The fundamental rule of the common law is that the administration of
justice must take place in open court. A court can only depart from this
rule where its observance would frustrate the administration of justice or
some other public interest for whose protection Parliament has modified
the open justice rule. The principle of open justice also requires that
nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate
reports of what occurs in the courtroom. Accordingly, an order of a
court prohibiting the publication of evidence is only valid if it is really
necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings
before it. The making of an order must also be reasonably necessary; and
there must be some material before the court upon which it can
reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order
prohibiting publication. Mere belief that the order is necessary is
insufficient.32
Justice McHugh was describing a principle of common law that had applied in New
South Wales for over one hundred and fifty years. In Scott v Scott the UK House of
Lords, criticizing divorce proceedings held behind closed doors, said:
This result, which is declared by the Courts below to have been
legitimately reached under a free Constitution, is exactly the same result
which would have been achieved under, and have accorded with, the
genius and practice of despotism. 33
It is therefore mnstitutional!J necessary for courts to adhere to the principle of open
justice. In Scott v Smtt, Lord Shaw also went on to say:
What has happened is a usurpation - a usurpation which could not have
been allowed even as a prerogative of the Crown, and most certainly
denied to the judges of the land. To remit the maintenance of
constitutional right to the region of judicial discretion is to shift the
foundations of freedom from the rock to the sand."
Lord Loreburn, in the same case, held open justice up as the most critical guarantee of
liberty:
32 John Faiifax & Sons v Police Tnbunal (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 47~77.
Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 47~77.33
34 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 47~77.
218
Civil liberty in this kingdom has two direct guarantees; the open
administration of justice according to known laws truly interpreted, and
fair constructions of evidence; and the right of Parliament, without let or
interruption, to inquire into, and obtain redress of, public grievances. Of
these, the first is by far the most indispensable; nor can the subjects of
any State be reckoned to enjoy a real freedom, where this condition is
not found both in its judicial institutions and in their constant exercise."
The reservation of the discretion by the Courts to determine the ambit of the
principle of open justice means that the place to go to develop the principle is the
Courts, not the Parliament.
Murmurs have now emerged in judgments of the High Court that the principle of
open justice may have a constitutional source. So, for example, in RlfSSell }) RlIJJell,16
Justice Gibbs approved the statement of the Privy Council in lv1{PhenOll t' McPIJerJoll)7
that 'publicity is the authentic hallmark of judicial as distinct from administrative
procedure' and the majority of the Court struck down a federal provision requiring a
State court to sit in private.
In Re Nolem; Ex parte YOtlllg'8 Justice Gaudron said that the 'judicial process', which
Her Honour has elsewhere confirmed has constitutional sources, includes 'open and
public inquiry (subject to limited exceptions) (and) the application of the rules of
natural justice'.
The open justice principle was approved by Justice McHugh in Grollo 1) Palmer.J') In
that case l\lcHugh J indicated that the source of the principle is the Constitution: 'open
justice' was said to be 'an essential feature of the federal judicial power'.
The principle is certainly regarded to have Federal constitutional dimensions within
New South Wales. In Jolm Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v The .Attomey-Cenerai o/NSLr::,T,41(
Spigelman CJ, Priestley and 1\leagherJJA said that 'the principle is so fundamental to
be of constitutional significance'. In reaching their conclusions, the Court of Appeal
referred extensively to Justice Gaudron's judgment in Re Nolan; Ex parte Young.
Scott IJ Scott [1913] I\C 417 at 477, quoting Hallam.
36 (1976) 134 CLR 495 at 520.
[1936] ~K 177 at 200 .
(1990) 172 CLR 460 at 496.
37
.18
3') (1995) 184 CLR 348 at 379.
[2000] NS\\?SC\ 198.
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Time For A Head Count And A Test Case?
For journalists and their lawyers, the next step is to do a head-count in the High
Court and find the right vehicle for a test case. I feel confident that a majority of the
Court would favour the development of the common law principle of open justice,
and a majority might confirm that it has a necessarily constitutional source.
These submissions will need to be developed very carefully because ultimately the
extent of any qualification or exception to the general principle of open justice is
governed by the principle of necessity." The necessity argument was touched on by
Chief Justice Spigelman in his keynote address to the 31st Australian Legal
Convention in 2000:
Australian public debate has a tendency to ignore such fundamental
principles, in the same way as we fail to appreciate the skill embedded in
the engineering infrastructure which ensures that if you flick a switch,
the lights go on or, if you turn a tap, water pours out. No one thinks
about it. We take it for granted.
In the constitutional context, once the High Court has decided that a new implied
right or freedom is necessary, then the capacity of litigants to influence judicial thinking
on the content of such a right may dramatically recede. In the mind of some people,
the failure of the High Court to deliver on the promise of its early free speech
jurisprudence demonstrates that this is so. If the principle of open justice is to be
entrenched by judicial exegesis rather than constitutional referendum - which is
probably much more likely - then steps need to be taken by journalists now to
educate lawyers and courts about the media, the dynamics of their profession, and
the dignity of risk that is a necessary concomitant of free speech.
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